



The present dissertation deals with selected questions arising in the course of the application 
of choice of law rules and of the foreign law designated on the basis thereof. In this context, 
the dissertation analyzes general issues connected to the selected questions and then 
compares the possible solutions as implemented in Czech law, EU law and in selected foreign 
laws. As far as Czech law is concerned, attention is also paid to its historical development; 
the same is true about some of the foreign laws discussed in the dissertation. The dissertation 
focuses on selected wording and interpretation difficulties that used to arise and still arise in 
the context of particular legal instruments. 
First, two basic hypotheses are set out; their verification is one of the aims of the dissertation. 
The first is the question of whether the doctrine of choice of law rules represents a self-
contained and self-sufficient system that – at least on a theoretical level – offers answers to 
all questions arising in the context of the application of choice of law rules. The second is the 
question of whether the concept of a bilateral choice of law rule, as commonly implemented 
today, facilitates international private law interaction and is – at least on a general level – a 
suitable way of governing international private law relationships. 
The first concept to be scrutinized is that of overriding mandatory provisions, i.e. those that, 
due to their crucial importance in domestic law, must be applied, even to a legal relationship 
otherwise governed by a foreign law. The concept is well accepted, as illustrated by an 
outline of Czech law and its historical development, the current state of EU law in this area, 
and the respective legal regulation in Poland, Germany and England.  
Subsequently, a number of difficulties are pointed out. These are related not only to 
exceptional or marginal questions, but to the very core of the concept. First, the delimitation 
of the concept under scrutiny, as opposed to other – similar or not really similar – concepts, is 
often unclear; this is the case in relation to mandatory rules, public law rules and public 
policy exemption. Next, no agreement exists as to whether overriding mandatory rules as a 
concept exist by their own virtue, or whether a specific rule establishing the concept is 
required. In some cases, it may even be questionable whether the application of overriding 
mandatory rules is mandatory, or whether the court (or other body) has a certain degree of 
discretion in this respect. The conclusion is made that while the concept of overriding 
mandatory rules is reasonable, in practice it leads to the weakening of legal certainty and 




The next concept to be scrutinized is the public policy (order public) exemption. It is a 
concept by virtue of which a court may refuse to apply a foreign law designated by a choice 
of law rule if such application were to lead to an unacceptable outcome. This concept too is 
commonly accepted, as demonstrated by Czech law and its historical development, the 
current state of EU law in this area, and the regulation thereof in laws of Poland, Russia and 
England. 
Thereafter, difficult points connected to the present concept are outlined. They relate in 
particular to the scope thereof, the question of the relationship thereof to the principle of good 
morals, the question of whether it is reasonable to require a certain level of intensity of a 
breach of public policy for the exemption to apply, as well as the question of whether court 
discretion is or should be allowed when applying the exemption. The conclusion is not 
materially different from that regarding overriding mandatory rules: a public policy 
exemption has its place in private international law, but at the same time it causes a number 
of issues that hamper international private transactions. 
The last topic to be discussed is that of renvoi, i.e. the question of whether or not to apply a 
choice of law rule of a foreign law to which a domestic choice of law rule has referred. The 
analysis is based on a scrutiny of Czech law and its development, EU law, and laws of 
Poland, England and the U.S. 
Problematic points are also highlighted in this context. They include a great variability of 
solutions adopted in different legal systems, their relationship to the theoretical grounds of 
the choice of law rule concept, and the fact that an attempt at a sophisticated solution may 
result in a regulation that is perfect from the doctrinal viewpoint, but difficult to apply in 
practice.  
In the final chapter of the dissertation, the above-outlined issues are summarized, while some 
others are raised. These include, in particular, the questionability of applying the principle 
that ignorance of law is no excuse in the context of the application of foreign law, and the 
imperfectly understood relationship between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement 
jurisdiction, in particular, the ease with which the fact is accepted that a certain legal topic 
may be subject to the legislation of one state, but the justice system of another.  
On the basis of the above, the response to the questions related to the hypotheses outlined in 




application of the lex fori would not represent an easier and ultimately also more just rule in 
whole categories of legal situations. 
 
